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Abstract
This study investigates the German media’s framing of the 2015–2016 “migration crisis” and their support 
and criticism of the initial open-door policy.  A standardized content analysis examines changes in media 
frames following the key event of assaults on New Year’s Eve (NYE) 2015.  It is analyzed how changes in 
coverage differed between public broadcasting news and infotainment formats (talk and satirical shows) 
and how they were related to governmental communication.  The findings contradict ideas of a state-con-
forming and uniform coverage of the “migration crisis.”  Media coverage did not parallel the governmental 
switch from support for the open-door policy to ambivalence after the NYE incidents but challenged govern-
mental communication with critical counter frames.  Regarding support for the open-door policy, the news 
media showed some parallels to the government’s frames; however, the infotainment media deviated in 
their frame agenda from the news media and thus contributed to diversity in media discourse.
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1 Introduction
Since the late summer of 2015, migration 
has become an intensely politicized issue 
in almost every European society (Barlai, 
Fähnrich, Griessler, & Rhomberg, 2017; 
Krzyz·anowski, Triandafyllidou, & Wodak, 
2018). Extensive media coverage centered 
on refugees drowning in the Mediterra-
nean Sea on their way to Europe and im-
ages of migration movements from Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq to and throughout 
the European Union (EU).
During the so-called “migration cri-
sis,”1 Germany was the main destination 
country for asylum seekers (Juran & Broer, 
2017). In the German public discourse, 
the emotional and televised encounter 
of chancellor Angela Merkel (Christian 
Democratic Union) with the Palestinian 
1 Migration was neither related to a significant 
economic breakdown nor to a similar strong 
social disruption as in the cases of war or 
natural disaster; hence, the quality of the sit-
uation as a crisis is contentious (Udris, 2019).
refugee girl, Rem, in July 2015 and later 
the iconic image of the dead body of Aylan 
Kurdi at the Turkish shore invoked intense 
moral pressure on migration and asylum 
policies (Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018). In 
this situation, Merkel’s famous dictum 
from August 31, We Will Manage It, set a 
strong frame that emphasized the high 
influx of migrants as a societal challenge, 
addressed citizens as a collective We, and 
motivated them for collective action in the 
name of humanity. The frame shaped gov-
ernmental actions and subsequent public 
perceptions of events (Mushaben, 2017; 
Pries, 2020). In September 2015, more than 
1000 refugees who were detained in Hun-
gary marched out of Budapest toward the 
Austrian border. In agreement with Austri-
an officials, the German government de-
cided to welcome refugees and allow them 
access to Germany instead of closing the 
borders.
At first, this open-door policy was 
broadly praised by the German public. In 
the later stages of events, however, justi-
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fying the decision became difficult. The 
public mood changed from solidarity and 
a welcome culture to warnings of a cul-
tural clash, increased crime, and social 
problems, such as a housing shortage. 
Additionally, the German government 
shifted toward more restrictive policies, 
for instance, limiting the right to family 
reunification, extending the definition of 
safe countries of origin, and implement-
ing measures for the faster deportation 
of irregular immigrants and rejected asy-
lum seekers (Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018). 
Within this process, several scholars iden-
tified the incidents on New Year’s Eve 
(NYE) 2015 as a key event for changes in 
the discourse on the “migration crisis” and 
the public acceptance of migrants in Ger-
many (Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; 
Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018). On NYE 2015, 
groups of men, most reportedly migrants 
from North Africa, attacked, robbed, and 
sexually harassed hundreds of women in 
Cologne and other German cities. While 
the German government was faced with 
accusations for a failed migration policy, 
the fact that, at first, German news media 
reported only gradually on these mass sex-
ual assaults contributed to public media 
criticism and right-wing hostilities, first 
and foremost, against public service me-
dia (Bielicki, 2018).
This study investigates how the me-
dia’s framing of the “migration crisis” 
changed following the incidents on NYE 
and to what extent German media sup-
ported or criticized the initial open-door 
policy before and after NYE. Unlike most 
previous works that have been limited to 
examinations of the news media’s coverage 
of the “migration crisis,” the content anal-
ysis presented in this study encompasses 
hard-fact oriented news and infotainment 
media formats that deal with a softening of 
news (Otto, Glogger, & Boukes, 2017). Due 
to the trends of commercialization and 
digitalization, infotainment media for-
mats – such as soft-news-focused news-
casts, political talk shows, and satirical 
shows – have become an important part of 
today’s pluralized media landscape (Farn-
sworth & Lichter, 2003; Thussu, 2007). Al-
though they are rarely studied in political 
communication science, they must be 
considered to contribute to public opin-
ion formation, and, in their depiction, 
they might deviate from the news media 
(Wessler, 2018). The sample for the media 
material under study comprises news-
casts, talk shows, and satirical shows from 
German public broadcasting. To assess 
how frames in media coverage are related 
to changes in government communication 
before and after NYE, the study on media 
content is complemented with an analysis 
of government communication.
The present article contributes to 
research on the media’s role during the 
“migration crisis” and on media–politics 
relations. The findings from the content 
analysis shed light on how the incidents 
on NYE 2015 have shaped the media’s 
depiction of the “migration crisis,” how 
changes in media coverage were related to 
changes in governmental communication, 
and how news and infotainment formats 
differed in their framing when they sup-
ported or criticized the open-door policy. 
The findings contradict widespread suspi-
cions against public service broadcasts for 
being biased in favor of migration and pro-
viding concordant and one-sided cover-
age (Brauck, Diez, Kühn, Müller, Nezik, & 
Steinmetz, 2016). It is demonstrated that 
the media functioned critically toward 
the open-door policy and governmental 
communication before and after the NYE 
incidents. Since infotainment media devi-
ated in their support and criticism of the 
open-door policy from the news media, 
they contributed to diversity in media dis-
course.
2 The media’s role in crisis 
communication
Political communication scholars have in-
tensively discussed the relation between 
policymaking and the media (e. g., Bau-
gut & Scherr, 2019). Although the media 
and politics are, to some extent, separate 
spheres with different agendas (Meyer, 
2002; Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007), the 
media’s influence on the citizens’ agenda 
and their perceptions of political issues are 
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broadly acknowledged. For policymakers, 
they thus serve as an arena for frame com-
petition as well as an indicator of the legit-
imacy of politics (Suchman, 1995; Wolfe, 
Jones, & Baumgartner, 2013).
From a normative point of view, the 
media are tasked with contributing to 
democracy by providing reliable infor-
mation and orientation, promoting social 
integration, and mobilizing individuals 
for societal objectives. The media should 
enable exchange and discussion between 
politicians and citizens and hold officials 
accountable (Blumler & Coleman, 2015; 
McQuail, 2010). Regarding the media’s 
normative role in media–policy relations, 
Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Norden-
streng and White (2009) differentiate be-
tween the main functions of criticism and 
cooperation. In their critical role, the me-
dia scrutinize political leadership. While 
alternative or critical media take a radical 
stance against power, mass media in the 
political mainstream instead function as 
watchdogs. They observe and comment on 
current processes and events and “bark” 
in the case of risks, threats, and dangers 
(Christians et al., 2009; Zaller, 2003). To 
fulfill their critical function, the media are 
asked to confront policymakers with at 
least one counter frame to the official gov-
ernmental interpretation (Entman, 2004).
In contrast, in their cooperative role, 
the media do not place themselves in ex-
plicit antagonism with political power but 
instead support societal processes. When 
they give voice to civil society actors, pro-
mote participation, or focus on reason and 
context instead of conflict, for instance, 
the media can facilitate public deliber-
ation, conflict resolution, and citizens’ 
self-government (Lynch & McGoldrick, 
2005; Wessler, 2018). In some cases, they 
collaborate with the state, thereby contrib-
uting to the creation of public consensus 
for specific policies and policy reforms. 
While the media’s cooperative role gener-
ally bears the risks of elite control and di-
minished diversity, in crisis situations, co-
operation can prevent panicked reactions 
among citizens and help push the appro-
priate political crisis responses (Christians 
et al., 2009).
Empirical findings on media–poli-
cy relations are mixed. In a survey study, 
scholars found that political elites per-
ceived the media to be influential for 
political careers and the policy agenda 
(Lengauer, Donges, & Plassner, 2014). 
Comparing policy documents with media 
coverage, content analyses found a rather 
moderate, and not unidirectional, agen-
da-setting effect of media coverage on 
the political agenda (Vliegenthart & Rog-
geband, 2007; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuy-
temans, 2008; Walgrave & van Aelst, 2006). 
According to Dekker and Scholten (2017), 
the media’s impact on the policy agenda is 
strongest when a variety of media outlets 
are consonant in their position on an issue 
and when this common position differs 
from the official policy agenda.
Most studies on the media–policy re-
lation use the framing approach. A frame is 
“a central organizing idea or story line that 
provides meaning to an unfolding strip 
of events” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 
p. 143). Frames emphasize a particular 
problem definition, its underlying causes, 
and its consequences. They thus promote 
a certain interpretation that contributes 
to the persuasiveness of arguments and 
suggests a positive or negative evaluation 
of the issue at stake (Entman, 1993). Pol-
icymakers use frames strategically. They 
are likely to receive support for their cri-
sis politics in media discourses when they 
adopt coherent and mutually reinforcing 
frames. To present their actions as “desir-
able, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, val-
ues, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 
1995, p. 574), policymakers use frames 
that resonate with a society’s culture, ap-
ply to common values (e. g., democracy 
and peace), and strengthen support for 
the proposed crisis response as a question 
of morality (Entman, 2004; Olsson, Söder-
lund, & Falkenheimer, 2015).
According to Bennett’s (1990) indexing 
thesis, the media tend to accept political 
leaders’ frames as long as top-level offi-
cials present a unified front, while counter 
frames may become more prevalent in cas-
es of open controversy about the issue at 
an elite level. Empirical studies on media 
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content have found that counter frames 
are limited, but not marginalized, in crisis 
situations, and the elite dominance of me-
dia frames is reduced over time (Bennett, 
Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006; Glazier & 
Boydstun, 2012; Hayes & Guardino, 2010). 
While the media have been found to exert 
efforts that demand accountability from 
the government, Bytzek’s (2005) analysis of 
the German media’s coverage of German 
engagement in the Kosovo crisis demon-
strated that criticism by the media was 
basically related to specific actions and 
measures but did not challenge the legit-
imacy of the government’s policy. In addi-
tion, the media’s tendency to domesticate 
(global) crisis events by stressing the rele-
vance for their own country and focusing 
on national actors (Eide & Ytterstad, 2011) 
can lead to parallels to official communi-
cations. Conversely, in cases of domestic 
crises, a broad range of midlevel sources 
provides journalists with information. Un-
like foreign policy crises, media coverage 
of domestic events has thus been found to 
substantially diverge from governmental 
communication (Allen & Blinder, 2018).
3 Framing migration in media and 
policy discourses
Migration policy is well known for being 
a highly contested policy domain (Bon-
jour & Schrover, 2015; Vliegenthart & Rog-
geband, 2007). In political and media de-
bates, competing frames portray migrants 
as victims, intruders, or economic refu-
gees and deal, for instance, with criminal-
ity, illegal migration, and Islam as threats 
as well as long-term economic risks and 
prospects (e. g., Benson, 2013; Greussing & 
Boomgaarden, 2017; Helbling, 2014; Hors-
ti, 2007; Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 2014; Rog-
geband & Vliegenthart, 2007; van Gorp, 
2005). Dekker and Scholten (2017) sum-
marized the variety of frames identified in 
different studies into four master frames: 
1) human interest, 2) migration as a threat, 
3) economy, and 4) migration as a gover-
nance challenge.
Previous studies have found conflict-
ing interactions and mutual influences be-
tween migration-related frames on policy 
and the media agenda (Dekker & Schol-
ten, 2017; Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 2014; 
Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Walgrave 
et al., 2008). In line with the indexing the-
sis, debates or reforms in the policy arena 
trigger media coverage and provide orien-
tation for the media’s framing of migration 
(Bonjour & Schrover, 2015; Vliegenthart & 
Walgrave, 2011). Klocker and Dunn (2003) 
found that the media followed the gov-
ernment’s negative tenor toward asylum 
seekers. However, the media can shape 
migration policies by stressing frames that 
are not dominant on the policy agenda. As 
some authors have argued, the coverage 
of migration in terms of a crisis and the 
presentation of migrants as intruders can 
push restrictive migration policies or hin-
der reforms for liberalization (Suro, 2009; 
Vukov, 2003). This is different when migra-
tion is predominantly framed as a gover-
nance challenge on the policy agenda, and 
the media simultaneously deploy the hu-
man-interest frame by focusing on life sto-
ries and individual tragedy. This constella-
tion leads to a highly emotionally loaded 
“David versus Goliath” or “human against 
the system” debate, which can pressure 
political leaders to make exceptions in 
singular cases or produce a more general 
policy turn toward liberalization (Bon-
jour & Schrover, 2015; Dekker & Scholten, 
2017; Horsti, 2007; Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 
2014).
Regarding the German discourse on 
the “migration crisis,” studies revealed an 
overall consonance between the different 
news media’s coverage that was seen as 
largely consistent with the policy agenda 
(Greck, 2018; Haller, 2017; Hemmelmann & 
Wegner, 2016; Maurer, Jost, Haßler, & Kru-
schinski, 2019). In the news media, the 
“migration crisis” was initially depicted as 
a humanitarian catastrophe that required 
immediate action. Even though the media 
were concerned with sociocultural chal-
lenges and the limited capacities to deal 
with the high influx of refugees, accord-
ing to Haller (2017), the notion of German 
welcome culture was actively supported 
by journalists. In a more nuanced analy-
sis, Maurer et al. (2019) demonstrated that 
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print and TV news media covered migrants 
in a positive tonality when individual and 
human-interest aspects were covered. 
Meanwhile, negative tonality was related 
to more abstract coverage dealing with mi-
gration as a risk and danger. Even though 
media coverage was found to be accurate 
in light of official statistics (Maurer et al., 
2019), in the general picture, the media 
took a rather supportive position toward 
governmental communication and policy 
decisions.
Several authors, however, have iden-
tified the incidents on NYE 2015 as a key 
event in German media discourse. Ac-
cordingly, the media began to strongly 
emphasize threats to security and cultural 
homogeneity in Germany (Haller, 2017). 
In the media representation of migrants, 
NYE marked a shift from predominant at-
tention toward vulnerable individuals and 
groups (children, female migrants, fam-
ilies) deserving help and compassion to 
young men who were perceived as a soci-
etal danger and the cultural “other” (Voll-
mer & Karakayali, 2018). Consistent with 
this previous work, it can therefore be ex-
pected that after the NYE events, the Ger-
man media deployed stronger criticism 
of the open-door policy in their framing 
of the “migration crisis” compared to the 
time before. Therefore, I propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H1: In the media’s framing of the “mi-
gration crisis,” criticism of the open-
door policy increased after the NYE 
events compared to the time before.
Existing studies have analyzed the con-
tent of hard-fact oriented news media, 
whereas research on infotainment media 
formats covering the “migration crisis” 
remains scarce. Contrary to quality news-
papers and public broadcasting news that 
routinely select, structure, and comment 
on information from the daily stream of 
events, commercial and highly soft-news-
focused newscasts, political talk shows, 
and satirical shows combine information 
with an entertaining style of presentation. 
In their coverage of the “migration crisis,” 
they are expected to have deviated from 
the news media in two significant ways: 
the extent to which they support or criti-
cize the government’s crisis management 
(and the open-door policy in particular), 
and the frames on which they base their 
support and criticism.
For example, political talk shows are a 
forum for discussing conflicting frames. As 
the selection of guests follows the princi-
ple of “confrontainment” (Klemm, 2015), 
or entertainment by confrontation, talk 
shows frequently include critical voices 
that challenge the government’s policies. 
Other infotainment formats are even more 
likely to fulfill the media’s critical function. 
Most prominently, satirical shows chal-
lenge established perspectives in current 
political and societal debates with a count-
er-narrative meant to criticize political 
leaders and traditional media discourses 
(McClennen & Maisel, 2014). According to 
studies on the depiction of the Ukraine cri-
sis (Lichtenstein & Koerth, 2020) and the 
“migration crisis” (Nitsch & Lichtenstein, 
2019), criticism of governmental policies 
is especially strong in satirical shows when 
the news media tend to support the gov-
ernment’s position. In the case of the “mi-
gration crisis,” the news media are expect-
ed to have supported the open-door policy 
before NYE and shifted toward criticism in 
the time after, when the government also 
shifted toward more restrictive policies. 
Therefore, the opposite is hypothesized 
for infotainment formats:
H2: Compared to the news media, in-
fotainment formats deployed a lower 
share of frames supporting the open-
door policy before the incidents on NYE 
and a higher share of supportive frames 
in the time after.
In more detail, news and infotainment 
formats are expected to have differed in 
the frames that they deployed when they 
supported and criticized the government’s 
open-door policy during the “migration 
crisis.” Based on Bennett’s (1990) indexing 
thesis, the news media are likely to adapt 
to government’s frames in their support 
for the open-door policy before the inci-
dents on NYE. Infotainment formats, how-
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ever, are said to focus less on policy issues 
while placing a stronger emphasis on hu-
man interest, conflict, and the emotional 
aspects of political issues (Baum, 2007; 
Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 
2012). They are expected to have framed 
support for the open-door policy as 
against tendencies toward populism and 
xenophobia. Similarly, in their criticism 
of the open-door policy, infotainment for-
mats might have focused less on policy 
criticism than on the government’s per-
formance as a crisis manager. Conversely, 
the news media are expected to have given 
policy criticism on the open-door policy. 
Therefore, in addition to H2, I propose the 
following two hypotheses:
H3: In their support for the open-door 
policy before the incidents on NYE, in-
fotainment media formats criticized 
populism and xenophobia more fre-
quently than the news media.
H4: In their criticism of the open-door 
policy, the news media used policy-re-
lated frames more frequently compared 
to infotainment media formats.
4 Method
To assess how news and infotainment me-
dia formats supported or criticized the 
open-door policy in their framing of the 
“migration crisis,” a systematic content 
analysis of media coverage in Germany 
was conducted. Additionally, to consider 
changes in governmental communication 
before and after the NYE incidents, the 
media analysis was supplemented with 
an analysis of government communica-
tion. The study examines and compares 
issue-specific frames. In contrast to stud-
ies on generic frames (which are more ab-
stract categories that can be analyzed in 
relation to different topics), the analysis 
of issue-specific frames enables the explo-
ration of the specific story lines about the 
“migration crisis” presented in news and 
infotainment media formats and govern-
mental communication (de Vreese, 2005).
4.1 Material under study
The analysis of government communica-
tion was based on press releases, govern-
ment statements, and transcripts from 
federal press conferences. The media sam-
ple consisted of a daily TV newscast and 
the infotainment formats of political talk 
shows and satirical shows. Due to the plu-
rality of existing media outlets, the sample 
is not representative of the German me-
dia landscape. For instance, it lacks con-
servative and liberal quality press, weekly 
magazines, the regional press, tabloids, 
and online news formats on YouTube. The 
sample, however, enables a comparison 
between prominent news and infotain-
ment formats and extends the spectra of 
media formats that are usually analyzed in 
crisis discourses.
The newscast Tagesschau was selected 
because of its high reputation and broad 
reach (see Appendix 1). The analysis of 
political talk shows referred to two of the 
broadest-reaching programs in Germany, 
Anne Will and Maybrit Illner, both of which 
are broadcast weekly. Three satirical shows 
were chosen, namely, the news satire show 
heute-show, the late-night show Neo Mag-
azin Royale (both broadcast weekly), and 
Die Anstalt (broadcast once a month), 
which follows the tradition of cabaret the-
ater. All the media selected are broadcast 
by German public service stations.
The analyzed period started in Sep-
tember 2015 after Merkel’s dictum, We 
Can Manage It, and her decision to imple-
ment the open-door policy, and it ended 
in April 2016 (Table 1). This timeframe 
enables the differentiation between two 
periods that are distinguished by the key 
event of NYE 2015, which was related to a 
discursive shift in public communication 
according to prior research (Haller, 2017; 
Hemmelmann & Wegner, 2016; Maurer 
et al., 2019). Due to the sample’s heteroge-
neity, the exact sampling procedure var-
ied among the different kinds of material 
under study. Government communication 
and the satirical shows entailed few frames 
per unit and were thus selected from over 
the whole period. Relevant governmental 
communication pieces were collected on 
the German government’s official website 
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(https://www.bundesregierung.de/) and 
identified by a keyword search using the 
terms Flucht, Flüchtling*, and Migration. 
The coding referred to a random sample of 
65 relevant government communication 
pieces. For the satirical shows, all 57 shows 
that addressed the “migration crisis” as the 
main topic in at least one thematic seg-
ment were selected. The relevant shows 
and segments were identified by using 
data from a previous project on political 
satire (Nitsch & Lichtenstein, 2019).
The investigation period for the news-
cast and talk shows was limited to 31 days, 
starting from the day after the key event 
(period 1: the open-door policy imple-
mentation on September 5, 2015; period 2: 
after NYE 2015). Within this time frame, 
the coding referred to a random sample of 
20 broadcasts per period for Tagesschau. 
Only crisis-relevant thematic segments 
of the newscast were coded. These were 
identified by the broadcast description 
on the website Tagesschau.de/archive. For 
talk shows, all broadcasts that referred to 
the “migration crisis” in their title or an-
nouncement in the defined time frames 
were selected (11 in total). Since talk shows 
are monothematic, coding referred to the 
complete shows.
4.2 Analysis and measures
In government communication and me-
dia material, the coding unit was the 
single frame of the “migration crisis” as 
occurring in a sentence or some connec-
tive sentences uttered by a specific public 
speaker. A frame establishes a specific un-
derstanding of the situation, for example, 
as a humanitarian crisis in Arab countries 
or as a political crisis in Germany. The 
coding followed a standardized proce-
dure using strictly defined categories to 
classify demanding interpretations (e. g., 
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Simon & Xe-
nos, 2000). The catalog of frames stemmed 
from a qualitative pre-study of a selection 
of the material following Mayring’s (2014) 
summarizing approach. In the pre-study, 
10 frames were identified and differenti-
ated inductively and structured into three 
frame groups according to their main fo-
cus on the crisis (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1989). In line with Entman’s (1993) popular 
definition of a frame consisting of four ele-
ments, the frames of the “migration crisis” 
were coded as a specific combination of a 
problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and treatment recom-
mendation. In the problem definition, 
frames deal with a global, European, or 
German perspective, which was decisive 
for the systematization of frames into 
frame groups.
Ten frames and three frame groups 
were differentiated. The frames in the first 
group address the “migration crisis” as a 
crisis in Arab countries and highlight the 
following: 1) the reasons for migration, 
such as terrorism, war, and poverty, or 2) 
the Western responsibility for econom-
ic problems and political conflicts in the 
Arab world. Both frames lead to the treat-
ment recommendation to receive refugees 
for humanitarian reasons. The frames 
in the second group refer to a Europe-
an crisis. They stress the following: 3) the 
conflicts between EU countries that un-
dermine a united EU crisis management, 
Table 1: Material under study 
Government  
communication
Newscast Talk shows Satirical shows
Sep 1–Dec 31, 2015
Press releases / broadcasts 44 20 5 32
Relevant thematic segments 0 68 0 80
Frames 62 255 266 251
Jan 1–Apr 30, 2016
Press releases / broadcasts 21 20 6 25
Relevant thematic segments 0 52 0 62
Frames 43 179 223 180
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or 4) the humanitarian or administrative 
problems inside EU countries arising from 
the influx of migrants. These frames tend 
to blame individual EU countries for the 
crisis. At the same time, they appeal for 
a greater commitment from the EU and 
a coordinated EU asylum policy in their 
treatment recommendation.
The third group of frames is more 
concerned with the political and social sit-
uation in Germany. These frames provide 
support for, or criticism of the open-door 
policy. The supportive frames focus on the 
following: 5) societal challenges in inte-
gration and cohabitation, 6) motivational 
appeals for welcoming the refugees, and 7) 
problematizing the increase in populism 
and radicalism in German society. Frames 
that criticize the open-door policy are pol-
icy-related when they highlight 8) deficits 
in the German asylum law combined with 
appeals for restrictions to limit migra-
tion. Other critical frames focus more on 
the government’s performance as a crisis 
manager and emphasize the following: 9) 
the open-door policy as political misman-
agement and 10) administrative problems 
with the handling of the influx of migrants.
A frame was coded when at least two 
frame elements were addressed by a public 
speaker. In the press material, the broad-
casts, and the speakers’ statements within 
the broadcasts, all identified frames were 
coded. One frame could be coded several 
times in one broadcast if addressed by dif-
ferent speakers or by the same speaker in 
different statements. Coding was conduct-
ed by four coders who were trained for six 
weeks. The reliability coefficient for the 
key variables showed a sufficient level (for 
the frames: Krippendorff’s α = .76, and for 
public speakers: α = .83). The reliability of 
the frames differed slightly among the ma-
terials under study (government commu-
nication: Krippendorff’s α = .77, newscast: 
α = .78, talk shows: α = .76, and satirical 
shows α = .74). Coder training and reli-
ability tests were based on the coding of 
40 randomly selected broadcast segments 
and 10 pieces of government communica-
tion releases, all of which included a total 
of 164 frames.
5 Results
A total of 1459 frames were coded. German 
governmental communication consisted 
of officials’ frames only (n = 105). Newscast 
frames (n = 434) stemmed from the news-
cast’s editorial staff (37.6 %) and external 
sources, who were most frequently repre-
sentatives from the German government 
(17.5 %) and non-governmental politicians 
(25.8 %). In the talk shows, most frames 
(n = 489) were sponsored by non-govern-
mental politicians (41.2 %), civil society 
actors (16.8 %), governmental politicians 
(11 %), and journalists (9.6 %). In the sa-
tirical shows, all coded frames on the “mi-
gration crisis” stemmed from the editorial 
staff members of the shows.
The findings revealed that before and 
after the incidents on NYE 2015, all the ana-
lyzed formats paralleled government com-
munication by depicting the “migration 
crisis” as a crisis in Germany predominant-
ly and as a European crisis secondarily (Ta-
ble 2). The strong focus on Germany can be 
explained by political efforts to recognize 
problems that directly affected German 
citizens, the media indexing the policy de-
bate (Bennett, 1990), and the media’s ten-
dency to domesticate global issues (Eide & 
Ytterstad, 2011). However, in doing so, the 
media tended to underemphasize the glob-
al dimension of the problem. This includ-
ed Western responsibilities for economic 
problems and political conflicts in the 
countries of origin as well as the reasons for 
migration, which contributed to legitimiz-
ing the influx of migrants on humanitarian 
grounds. Domestication can also convey 
the misleading idea that the crisis could be 
solved in and by Germany.
For the frame group European crisis, 
governmental communication and media 
coverage highlighted the crisis of the EU 
more often than the problems in individu-
al EU countries. The frame Crisis of the EU 
stressed the need for a coordinated EU asy-
lum policy and mainly attributed responsi-
bility to the EU. From the German govern-
ment’s perspective, the frame allowed it to 
present itself as a European crisis manager 
and to externalize blame for the tense sit-
uation in Germany to other EU countries 
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(such as Hungary and Poland) that prevent-
ed a common EU asylum policy. After NYE, 
disruptive events and decreasing public 
acceptance of the high migration influx put 
pressure on the German government to ex-
ternalize the blame. Thus, the government 
placed an increased emphasis on the Eu-
ropean dimension of the issue, which was 
not paralleled to the same extent in media 
discourse.
Within the frame group Crisis in Ger-
many, differences in support for and criti-
cism of the open-door policy (as expressed 
in the respective framing of the “migration 
crisis”) became obvious between the pe-
riods before and after the NYE incidents 
(Figure 1). Consistent with policy chang-
Table 2: Frame groups in government communication and media coverage, (in %)


















Arab crisis 10 7 14 10 11 10 9 4
Western  
res ponsibility 7 0 9 3 3 5 9 4
Reasons for 
migration 3 7 6 7 8 5 0 0
Frame group: 
European crisis 29 40 27 21 25 21 22 23
Crisis of the EU 18 26 18 18 23 19 17 22
EU country  
in crisis 11 14 9 2 3 2 4 2
Frame group:
Crisis in Germany 61 54 59 70 64 70 70 73
Note: Differences in the sum are due to rounding. For the frame groups Arab crisis and European crisis, the table also discloses the values 
for the single frames.










































Note: Percentages for support for and criticism of the open-door policy result from the total of supportive frames (Integration and Cohabi-
tation, We Will Manage It, Populism and Radicalism) and critical frames (German Asylum Policy, Political Mismanagement, Administrative 
Problems).
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es, the German government initially sup-
ported the open-door policy but was more 
ambivalent in the time after NYE [χ² (1, 
N = 61) = 4.16, p = .042].
In contrast to the expectation in hy-
pothesis 1, the media did not parallel gov-
ernmental communication and showed no 
increased criticism after the NYE events 
compared to the time before. In the peri-
od before the NYE events, the analyzed 
media formats deployed frames that were 
in line with government communication 
and supported the open-door policy to 
the extent of 35 % to 41 % only. The media 
thus already had a stronger focus on criti-
cal counter frames before NYE, and media 
criticism of the open-door policy did not 
increase in the time after. While the news-
cast Tagesschau framed the “migration 
crisis” in a similar critical way during both 
periods under study, the share of support 
for the open-door policy increased sig-
nificantly in the talk shows [58.1 %; χ² (1, 
N = 324) = 9.61, p = .002] and satirical shows 
[70.2 %; χ² (1, N = 306) = 36.29, p = .001] and 
now outweighed criticism. This finding 
contrasts with previous research that found 
strong media support for a welcome cul-
ture (Haller, 2017). Consonance in media 
criticism on the open-door policy, howev-
er, must be considered to have influenced 
the political agenda (Dekker & Scholten, 
2017). Pressure from media coverage thus 
explains, to some extent, the switch in gov-
ernmental communication from support 
for the open-door policy to ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 2 is partly confirmed. This 
hypothesis proposes that, compared to 
news media, infotainment formats were 
more critical of the open-door policy be-
fore NYE and more supportive in the time 
after. However, the newscast and infotain-
ment formats showed no significant differ-
ence in the extent of their support or criti-
cism for the open-door policy in the period 
before NYE.2 After NYE (and in accordance 
with H2), frames that supported the open-
2 The critical frames were addressed signifi-
cantly more frequently than the supportive 
frames in the newscast [χ² (1, N = 150) = 7.71, 
p = .006], the talk shows [χ² (1, N = 169) = 5.69, 
p = .017], and the satirical shows [χ² (1, 
N = 175) = 14.86, p = .001].
door policy were more common in the in-
fotainment media formats of talk shows 
[59 %; χ² (1, N = 279) = 13.08, p = .001] and 
satirical shows [70 %; χ² (1, N = 255) = 29.51, 
p = .001] compared to traditional news-
casts (36 %). Satirical shows also deployed 
a significantly higher share of support-
ing frames compared to talk shows [χ² (1, 
N = 286) = 4.54, p = .033]. Satirical shows 
played their critical role in opposing gov-
ernmental communication in both periods 
under study and by opposing news media 
discourse after the NYE events. In addition, 
the higher share of frames supporting the 
open-door policy after NYE demonstrates 
that the soft-news focus of infotainment 
is not related to stronger criticism in info-
tainment formats.
Differences in the framing of the “mi-
gration crisis” between the news and info-
tainment media and their relationship to 
governmental communication varied be-
tween the periods under study. Before NYE, 
the government’s communication aligned 
with the aim to legitimate the open-door 
policy (Table 3). Using the frame Integra-
tion and Cohabitation, the government 
met the German citizens’ concerns about 
the effects of migration on their daily lives. 
The frame We Will Manage It aimed at mo-
tivating citizens and claimed that German 
politics and society could successfully 
solve the crisis together. In contrast, the 
frame Populism and Radicalism criticized 
and warned of xenophobia and populism.
As anticipated by H3, the newscast, 
when expressing support for the open-
door policy, tended to follow the govern-
ment’s framing of the “migration crisis.” 
Contrary to expectations, the same also 
applied to the infotainment format of talk 
shows. Both formats ranked the govern-
ment’s main frame Integration and Cohab-
itation as primary and the frame We Will 
Manage It as secondary. They reported on 
volunteers who were actively supporting 
the influx of migrants. The satirical shows, 
however, addressed the governmental 
frames to a lesser extent compared to the 
newscast and talk shows.3 Instead, satir-
3 For the frame Integration and Cohabitation, 
the difference between satirical shows and 
talk shows [χ² (1, N = 344) = 4.57, p = .033] 
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ical shows deployed the frame Populism 
and Radicalism, criticizing xenophobic at-
titudes in society more frequently than did 
the newscast [χ² (1, N = 325) = 6.54, p = .011] 
and talk shows [χ² (1, N = 344) = 5.98, 
p = .014]. In adopting this frame, satirical 
shows took a moral stance against grow-
ing xenophobia and right-wing violence. 
Hypothesis 3, which proposes that the 
infotainment formats criticized populism 
and xenophobia more frequently than did 
the news media, is thus confirmed from 
the findings on the difference between the 
newscast and satirical shows.
Regarding criticism of the open-door 
policy, policy-related criticism (expressed 
by the frame German Asylum Policy) was 
more frequently found in the analyzed 
newscast than in the infotainment for-
mats. In contrast, criticism of the govern-
ment’s general performance as a crisis 
manager (expressed by the frames Political 
Mismanagement and Administrative Prob-
lems) was more frequently found in the in-
fotainment media formats. This difference 
proved to be significant between the news-
cast and talk shows [χ² (1, N = 192) = 5.45, 
p = .020] as well as between the newscast 
and satirical shows [χ² (1, N = 205) = 28.45, 
p = .001] and thus confirms hypothesis 4. 
However, Political Mismanagement, which 
criticized the government’s crisis manage-
ment and challenged its reputation, was 
the most frequently stressed frame in both 
proved significant. Regarding the lower em-
ployment of the frame We Will Manage It in 
the satirical shows, the difference proved to 
be significant in comparison to the newscast 
[χ² (1, N = 325) = 6.43, p = .011] and the talk 
shows [χ² (1, N = 344) = 4.72, p = .030].
the newscast and talk shows. In talk shows, 
this frame included, for instance, warnings 
of symbolic effects because the open-door 
policy could be perceived as an invitation 
to people in Arab countries to migrate to 
Germany. In contrast to the newscast and 
talk shows, the satirical shows treated the 
frames German Asylum Policy and Political 
Mismanagement only as side aspects of the 
debate and, instead, more dominantly fo-
cused on Administrative Problems.4 In do-
ing so, they resisted criticizing the princi-
ple of the open-door policy but highlighted 
fixable bureaucratic problems.
After the NYE incidents, government 
communication switched from promoting 
a welcoming of refugees to a framing that 
was more suitable for legitimizing restric-
tions in migration policy (Table 4). There-
fore, the government deployed the frames 
German Asylum Policy and Integration and 
Cohabitation. The combination of these 
frames resulted in promising restrictive 
asylum policies as a reaction to societal 
problems, while simultaneously appealing 
to peaceful cohabitation. This indicated 
an attempt to calm the debate by promis-
ing a decrease in the migration influx.
Regarding support for the open-door 
policy, all the analyzed media formats, 
however, paralleled the government com-
munication by giving much attention to the 
frame Integration and Cohabitation. While 
the frame We Will Manage It lost weight in 
government communication and the an-
4 The satirical shows used the frame Ad-
mi ni s trative Problems significantly mo-
re fre quently than the newscast [χ² (1, 
N = 325) = 46.47, p = .001] and the talk shows 
[χ² (1,  N = 344) = 52.28, p = .001].
Table 3: Framing the migration crisis as a German crisis in government communication and the 
media, Sep 1–Dec 31, 2015, (in %)
Government  







Integration and Cohabitation 42 15 18 10
We Will Manage It 16 14 12 6
Populism and Radicalism 16 9 10 19
German Asylum Policy 16 20 11 3
Political Mismanagement 0 25 33 9
Administrative Problems 1 17 16 53
Note: Differences in the sum are due to rounding.
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alyzed media formats, the satirical shows 
paid particularly strong attention to the 
frame Populism and Radicalism, which 
was found significantly less frequent-
ly in the newscast [χ² (1, N = 154) = 10.10, 
p = .001]. The satirical shows thereby act-
ed to criticize the xenophobic tendencies 
among the German population. To a less-
er extent, the talk shows also pointed out 
the social divide on the issue of migration, 
referring to the frame Populism and Rad-
icalism.
However, the second government fra-
me, German Asylum Policy, which pro-
mised legislative restrictions to liberal mi-
gration policy, was deployed to a rather low 
extent in all formats. As expected in hy-
pothesis 4, this policy-related criticism was 
more frequently deployed in the newscast 
compared to the infotainment media for-
mats, which had a stronger focus on criti-
cism of the government’s performance as a 
crisis manager. The difference is significant 
in the comparison between the newscast 
and satirical shows [χ² (1, N = 118) = 6.63, 
p = .010], but not between the newscast and 
talk shows. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is only 
partially confirmed. The frame Political 
Mismanagement ranked first in the news-
cast and second in the talk shows. This 
frame, however, registered a comparably 
low level in the satirical shows, where Ad-
ministrative Problems remained the most 
frequently used counter frame. Consistent 
with a previous study (Nitsch & Lichten-
stein, 2019), the satirical shows thus also 
resisted denouncing the open-door policy 
as political mismanagement in the time af-
ter the NYE events.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The comparison between the framing of 
the “migration crisis” before and after the 
incidents on NYE revealed changes in gov-
ernmental communication. Still, it provid-
ed little evidence for the interpretation of 
NYE as a turning point in the media’s eval-
uation of the open-door policy. This can be 
stated even though previous studies found 
a decrease of support for migration and 
growing attention toward less vulnerable 
groups of migrants in the media following 
the NYE events (Haller, 2017; Vollmer & 
Karakayali, 2018).
The findings also contradict claims 
that suspected the media of a state-con-
forming coverage of the “migration crisis.” 
Compared to governmental communica-
tion, the media followed a separate frame 
agenda that to a large extent criticized 
the open-door policy and exercised pres-
sure on governmental communication. 
The strong presence of counter frames 
that criticized the open-door policy can 
be explained by the media’s focus on the 
“migration crisis” as a domestic crisis and 
not a foreign one. Thus, journalists were 
likely to include midlevel sources instead 
of relying only on governmental frames 
(Allen & Blinder, 2018). In addition, the 
governmental frames were contrasted by 
visible administrative problems. This find-
ing of strong media criticism, particularly 
before the NYE events, is well in line with 
research on the media coverage of mi-
gration (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007; 
van Gorp, 2005; Vukov, 2003), although it 
contradicts to some extent prior research 
on the crisis discourse on migration in 
Table 4: Framing the migration crisis as a German crisis in government communication and the 









Integration and Cohabitation 35 22 33 32
We Will Manage It 9 7 7 0
Populism and Radicalism 4 7 19 38
German Asylum Policy 39 13 5 1
Political Mismanagement 0 35 20 9
Administrative Problems 13 16 17 20
Note: Differences in the sum are due to rounding.
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Germany (Haller, 2017; Hemmelmann & 
Wegner, 2016). This can be explained by 
methodological considerations. Unlike 
previous analyses on keywords and the 
overall tonality of coverage, this study pro-
vides a more in-depth systematic analy-
sis, taking all frames deployed in a media 
piece into account.
For the comparison between me-
dia formats, this study showed that in-
fotainment formats contributed to me-
dia discourse on the “migration crisis” 
with a frame agenda that deviated from 
the newscast. While this contradicts the 
idea of uniform media coverage in public 
broadcasting, the findings provide little 
support for the assumption that news and 
infotainment media formats systematical-
ly differed in their cooperative or critical 
role with respect to the state. In particular, 
the newscast Tagesschau did not prove to 
fulfill the expected cooperative function 
but demonstrated criticism of the open-
door policy before the incidents on NYE. 
In line with the indexing thesis (Bennett, 
1990), this can be explained by a lack of 
elite consensus in politics, as parties were 
divided about crisis management, and 
thus, provided critical orientation.
As expected, news and infotainment 
formats were found to deviate in the way 
they criticized the open-door policy. Com-
pared to the infotainment media formats, 
the newscast emphasized policy-related 
criticism more frequently. This is in line 
with a stronger focus on hard news, while 
infotainment media have a stronger em-
phasis on conflict, emotion, and human 
interest (Baum, 2007; Reinemann et al., 
2012), leading them to put a spotlight on 
the government’s general performance 
as a crisis manager. In doing so, the talk 
shows constantly presented competing 
frames and highlighted conflict, with a 
strong focus on political mismanagement. 
Thus, satirical shows took a critical stance 
against governmental communication – 
but not against the open-door policy – and 
tended to oppose central frames in the 
newscast and, to some extent, in the talk 
shows.
This study extended the spectra of me-
dia that are usually analyzed in research 
on media–politics relations. Nevertheless, 
the sample showed only a non-represen-
tative portion of the German media sys-
tem, and most importantly, the plurality 
of online media was not represented. A 
further limitation concerns the selected 
time frame, which is only relevant to two 
major events in the “migration crisis” from 
a German perspective: the welcoming of 
refugees and the incidents on NYE. Both 
events dominated the crisis discourse for 
long periods. However, how other events, 
such as terrorist attacks or violent inci-
dents against migrants, were related to 
even slight changes in the framing of the 
“migration crisis” was not examined. For 
such a detailed analysis of changes in the 
use of frames over time, a more extensive 
data collection would be required.
The analyzed material was selected 
for two distinct periods divided by the key 
event of NYE 2015. However, the materi-
al covered the periods under comparison 
differently, varying between 30 days and 
both periods as a whole. This methodolog-
ical ambiguity was employed to guarantee 
a sufficient number of frames for each in-
vestigation unit. However, the overall de-
sign allowed for a comparison of media 
formats and the media and policy agenda, 
but not analysis of causalities between 
them. Hence, further research should fo-
cus more on the interactions between gov-
ernment and media communication. Fu-
ture studies should also include strategic 
communication from civil society organi-
zations and other interest groups, such as 
Pro Asyl and Pegida.
Despite these limitations, the findings 
revealed that news and infotainment for-
mats created a critical media environment 
in which the German government did not 
achieve support for its open-door policy. 
The media acted in line with their norma-
tive task to scrutinize politics with counter 
frames and to hold the government ac-
countable (Christians et al., 2009; Entman, 
2004). As all the analyzed media formats 
were from public broadcasting, this con-
tradicts claims that public broadcasting 
serves as mere conformist mouthpieces of 
the state. In addition, the findings showed 
that different infotainment media formats 
14 Lichtenstein / Studies in Communication Sciences (2021), pp. 1–18
displayed their own accounts of crisis 
discourses and political events. This calls 
for further discussions regarding a more 
systematic differentiation of the impacts 
of infotainment media formats on public 
opinion formation in an increasingly com-
plex media environment.
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Appendix
Table A1: Media material under study
Reach (in millions) Market share (in %) Channel
Newscast
Tagesschau, 8 p. m. 4.99 17.9 Das Erste
Talk shows
Anne Will 1.47 10.2 Das Erste
Maybrit Illner 2.49 12.1 ZDF
Satirical shows
heute-show 3.46 14.4 ZDF
Die Anstalt 2.29 11.4 ZDF
Neo Magazin Royale 0.12 1.4 ZDF
Note: Numbers refer to the year 2015 (source: www.quotenmeter.de). For Neo Magazin Royale, the numbers were available only for the 
period of January to June 2015; Neo Magazine Royale reaches only a small audience via TV but is highly viewed via the online ZDF Media-
thek.
